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LJABaiTY WITHOUI' PRIVITY: 
DEVELOPMENI'S IN THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
by 
Patricia M. Pattison· 
·Daniel J. Herron-
"The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.'' 1 
This statement, originally made by Cardozo, has been widely quoted, especially by 
William Prosser. Concerning products liability, Prosser noted in 1960 that the assault 
was weD developed;2 in 1966 he concluded that the citadel had fallen.3 
The citadel of privity is again under assault This time it relates to liability for 
defective housing. Specifically, this paper will (1.) review the backgrowtd and origin 
of the implied wammty of habitability, (ll.) identify seven factors which court 
decisions have weighed and utilized in defining and refining the warranty, (DI.) 
analyze the heart of the implied warranty privity issue, {N.) 
compare the application of the warranty with the development of products liability, 
and conclude by speculating on possible new directions for the development of the 
Warranty. 
· Professor, College of Business Administration, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming . 
.. Associate Professor, Richard I . Farmer School of Business Administration, Miami 
University, Oxford, Ohio. 
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I. Background 
The doctrine of caveat emptor in the housing industiy is dying.4 In the past 
twenty-five years, nearly all jurisdictions hav: or at least 
it with either an implied warranty of habitability or some modificatJ.on of 1t 
Unfortunately, neither builders nor purchasers are able to predict what the court-
created warranty requires or offers. The piecemeal birth of the warranty has resulted 
in a ghost child who assumes different shapes and names depending upon the 
jurisdiction of its birth. It is not the purpose of this section to closely examine each 
inconsistency, but merely to state the general rule or trend. 
The first case directly touching upon the warranty of habitability issue in this 
cotmtry appears to be a 1957 case from the Ohio court of appeals.6 The plaintiffs, in 
this case the homeowners (and initial-purchasers), alleged that the contractors-
defendants failed to construct the home in a workmanlike manner since sewage and 
water flooded the home's basement. The cowt focused on the fact that the sale of the 
house took place priQ! to the completion of the house. 
note 
This remained an important concept since the cowt went to great lengths to 
In this opinion we will not go into a discussion of the duty of the 
seller of a completed house to the buyer, with every varying 
circwnstance surrollllding such sale. Nor will we discuss the legal 
questions of caveat emptor and express wamm.ty, except to say only 
that the vendor of a completed house, in respect of which there is no 
work going on and no work to be done, does not generally, in the 
absence of some express bargain or warranty, undertake any obligation 
with regard to the condition of the house ... 7 
The Ohio cowt,stating that " ... we have found but few cases bearing upon the 
question. We have folllld none in this state directly touching it",8 cited to and focused 
on established English precedents holding that " ... upon the sale of a house in the 
course of erection, there is an implied warranty that the house will be finished in a 
workmanlike manner. "9 
Seven years later the Colorado Supreme Cowt would wrestle with the same 
dearth oflegal precedents as the Ohio appellate court. There the Conrt also relied upon 
established English precedent in adopting the implied warranty citing to the same 
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English cases explained in the Ohio decision. 10 However, the Colorado conrt 
expanded the English decisions. While the Ohio court, like the English courts, 
premised the implied warranty as ex:isting in a sale occurring before the house was 
fully constructed. the Colorado conrt encompassed not only houses still under 
construction but also newly finished houses. The court reasoned: 
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is 
near completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems 
incongruous. To say that the foimer may rely on an implied warranty and the 
latter cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.11 
This well-reasoned Colorado opinion provi<Ies the starting point for most jurisdictions' 
subsequent adoption and modification of the implied warranty of habitability. 
Consequently, a summary of the various court decisions reveals generally: 
When a builder-vendor sells a home to an initial purchaser there is created an implied 
warranty of habitability. However, in any specific circumstance it would be unwise to 
exclusively rely upon this general rule because of its many and varied exceptions. 
Following is a general discussion of seven factors which most C9urts consider in their 
analyses of the applicability of the implied warranty. 
ll. Factors 
Builder-vendor 
Most jurisdictions have specifically limited liability to a builder vendor. 12 A 
builder-vendor has been defined as "one who buys land and builds homes upon that 
land for purposes of sale to the general public. "13 One court explained why the 
builder-vendor should be the responsible party: 
The applicability of the implied warranty is based upon the premise that, 
with respect to the sale of new homes. the purchaser has little choice but to rely 
upon the integrity and professional competence of the builder vendor. The 
public interest dictates that if the construction of a new house is defective, its 
repair cost should be borne by the responsible builder-vendor who created the 
defect and is in a better economic position to bear the loss, rather than by the 
ordinary purchaser who justifiably relied upon the builder's skill. 14 
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The definition of builder-vendor has been further refined by some courts to also 
include that the builder-vendor be engaged in that profession. Consequently, the sale 
is couunercial rather than casual or personal in nature. 15 Titis limitation has been 
placed to protect those vendors who have no greater skill relevant to determining the 
quality of a house than the purchaser.16 As with the UCC "merchant", any person who 
holds himself out as having particular skill and knowledge in his trade should be held 
to a higher degree of responsibility. 
Courts in a few jurisdictions have chosen to expand the number of persons 
potentially liable for breach of the implied warranty. Some have held vendors, .who 
were not also the builders, liable.17 Vendors of the real estate were held liable 
although an independent contractor had constructed the defective house. One court 
explained its reasoning by noting that the vendor bad "placed the house in the stream 
of commerce and had exacted a fair price for it Its liability -is not foWld upon fault, 
but because it has profited by receiving a fair price and, as between it and an innocent 
purchaser, the innocent purchaser should be protected from latent defects." 18 
Another comt fmmd a builder who was not the vendor liable. The court could 
see no difference between a builder or contractor who constructs a home and a 
builder-developer. It doesn't matter whether the builder constructs the residence on 
land he owns or land the purchaser owns. It is the structure and all its intricate 
components and related facilities that are the subject matter of the implied warranty. 
Mere builders must be as accountable for their worlananship as are builder 
developers.19 
Although the of jurisdictions agree that the implied warranty attaches 
to the sale of new housing/ some questions as to what is "new housing" have arisen. 
Early in the development of the implied warranty, several states, relying on the English 
precedents, distinguished between sales made while the homes were still under 
construction and sales of completed homes?1 The earlier decisions limited recovery to 
cases where the home was under construction at the time of sale, following what is 
commonly referred to as the "Miller Rule."22 However, as reasoned by the Colorado 
Supreme Court, most jurisdictions have reversed their earlier decisions,23 finding no 
sound rationale for the distinction. 
Some courts, however, have substituted the word "construction" for "housing" 
when finding an implied warranty.24 The result is warranty protection which extends 
to apartment buildings,25 grain and condominiwns.27 It has been argued 
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that the extension is tmwise and unsubstantiated when considered with the purpose of 
the warranty itsel£28 Relatively unknowledgeable buyers are those the warranty is 
supposedly designed to protect. In contrast, purchasers of larger constructions should 
have greater expertise or the funds to pmchase expert advice. 
Since the imposition of the 1Ulqualified implied warranty is based upon the 
theory that it is the ordinary home buyer, relatively ignorant of the business of buying 
a home, who needs this statutory protection, the unqualified wammty is implied only 
in purchases of one- or two-family homes. Anything larger than a two-family 
dwelling is often an apartment house, and these are commonly pmchased by 
corporations or individuals with enough wealth to afford competent inspection or 
knowledge of the realty business?9 
Initial Purchaser 
With a few exceptions most state comts have limited recovery to initial 
purchasers. A Missouri court explained that the contractual nature of the implied 
warranty implicitly limits the right of action to the first purchase:30 
Because the warranty is implied by virtue of the contemplated sale to 
the first purchaser and arises by reason of the purchase, it theoretically accrues 
in him. The practical aspects of the contractual defenses also lead to this 
conclusion. The first purchaser is the only one with whom the builder may 
negotiate an allocation of the ri.sk. Furthennore, the builder is in a better 
position to know the condition of the home at the time of sale, and thus 
whether defects were latent This is not true if the builder is sued by a 
subsequent vendee?1 
In California a court noted that this initial purchaser is the one who most needs 
the warranty protection. 32 The purchaser of a neyt building. unlike the buyer of an 
older building has had "no opportunity to observe how the building has withstood the 
passage of time. Thus he generally relies on those in a position to know the of 
the work to be sold, and his reliance is surely evident to the construction indust:Iy." 3 
The Implied Warranty Itself 
There are two general premises upon which most jurisdictions agree. First is 
the fact that the warranty is an implied one that is created by law and which 
exists regardless of the intent of the parties. Because home purchasers rely on the 
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knowledge and judgment of the.ir vendors, the warranty springs from the vendors' duty 
not to take advantage of their superior positions.34 Second, negligence is not a relevant 
issue. In one of the earlier cases holding that a new homeowner was entitled to 
recover on an implied warranty of fitness for habitation, the cowt also held 1ha.t fault 
or on the part of the defendant was not required in order for the plaintiff to 
recover. The fact that the defendant was the vendor of the real estate was sufficient 
to make him liable. In a more recent decision another court agreed that "[o]n an 
implied wammty, one may be held liable for damages even when he has exercised all 
reasonable or even possible care.36 
Some courts bave described the warranty as one of "fitness for habitation't37 
while others have required "workmanlike construction. "38 The definition of "fit for 
habitation" has caused some concern for the courts. The most extensive discussion of 
habitability is found in the Dlinois case v. Fox Valley Construction 
Companv?9 The court set down what is considered to be the basic parameters of 





It is possible for a new home to be in substantial compliance with 
building codes and still be wrinhabitable. 
The primary function of a new home is to shelter its inhabitants from 
the elements. If a new home does not keep out the elements because of 
a substantial defect of construction, such home is not habitable within 
the meBning of the implied warranty of habitability. 
Another function of a new home is to provide its inhabitants with a 
reasonably safe place to live, without fear of injury to person, health, 
safety, or property. If a new home is not structurally soood because of a 
substantial defect of construction, such a home is not habitable within 
the meaning of the implied warranty of habitability. 
If a new home is not aesthetically satisfying because of a defect of 
construction, such a defect shoUld not be considered as making the 
home uninhabitable. 
In another case the dispute also rested upon the determination of the type of 
defect which renders a new home uninhabitable. The plaintiffs attempted to show that 
their premises were rendered uninhabitable by noise from an air conditioning system. 41 
Evidently the noise was undetectable during normal conversation sounds, but 
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disturbed them in the still of the night. The court rejected their azgwnents stressing the 
fact that the test of breach of the warranty is an objective one; i.e., what reasonable 
people would expect If "the premises met ordinary, normal standards reasonably to 
be expected of living quarters of comparable kind and quality"42 they are deemed 
habitable. There is no warranty to protect certain individuals who are hypersensitive. 
The question "What is worlananlike construction?" bas not received the same 
amount of attention as the issue of habitability. Evidently the courts have had little 
difficulty in assessing it However, there is one noteworthy case in which a cowt 
found a breach of the "implied warranty of proper construction and sound 
workmanship. ,43 This case is mentioned because in it the court extended the meaning 
of worlananship to include the concept of design. The builder had installed a septic 
tank which failed to function properly. Apparently there was no defect in the material 
or worlananship, but nevertheless the court found a breach of because of a 
"defect in the design from the time the septic tank was being installed 
A court's choice of terminology (habitability or workmanlike construction) 
could determine the buyer's ability to recover from his seller. A buyer who would win 
a suit based on habitability could lose if the court recognized only the warranty of 
workmanlike construction. As an illustration, consider a situation in which a builder 
drilled a well in a workmanlike manner, but found no water fit for human 
consumption.45 In this particular case the buyer recovered damages because the court 
defined the warranty as fitness for habitation, but he would have lost had only 
workmanlike construction been required. · 
On the other hand, consider the situation of the home buyer who receives an 
improperly constructed fireplace. Obviously, he could recover damages under the 
warranty of worlananlike construction, but in today's homes fire.places may be more 
decorative than necessary. It might appear that buyers receive the most protection in 
states where the cowts say that both warranties are implied. 46 Then, however, the 
buyers might have the burden of proving that warranties were breached One 
plaintifl: caught in the quandazy of words, lost his suit because he alleged only poor 
workmanship and did not also allege that the home was not fit for human habitation. 47 
Types of Defects 
There has been a wide variance in the type of defect for which the courts have 
allowed recove.ty. Generally, the courts have agreed that the defect must be a latent or 
hidden defect which would not be apparent to the buyers upon reasonable inspection. 
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If the party asserting the implied warranty has a reasonable opportunity to discover the 
defect and did not do so, the seller has a valid defense.48 
While some courts have allowed recovery for structural defects only, most have 
included site or lot defects. A Pennsylvania court, reasoning that the purchaser of real 
estate justifiably relies on his seller's expertise and superior opportunity to choose a 
suitable site, became the first to hold a builder·vendor liable for latent site defects not 
involving damage to a dwelling.49 This case along with many others t? follow, 50 
involved a well which produced no water fit for human consumption. The 
Pennsylvania court found that potable water supply is within the scope of the builder· 
vendor's implied warranty because without it a house is rendered tminhabitable. This 
rule stands true even when the quality of the water is not the result of poor drilling 
techni'l!!es.s1 Other defects included defective ":ater 
homes,53 cracked foundations and concrete worl<, defective arr condit:J.omng, · 
floors, 56 fireplaces, 57 electrical systems, S& roofs, 59 heating, 60 insulation, 61 and 
plumbing.62 
Duration of the Warranty 
Obviously a pmchaser will not be able to discover the defects in his new home 
mrtil he has oe<:upied the house for a reasonable length of time. The difficult decision 
facing the coW'ts has been ''What constitutes a reasonable time?" As can be expected, 
the comts have been reluctant to limit the warranty to a specific period. One of the 
earlier decisions dealing with the duration of the builders liability was handed down 
by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. In it the court stated: 
.... where there is a sale of a new house by a vendor who is also the 
builder thereo:( there is an implied warranty of reasonable workmanship and 
habitability sW'Viving the delivery of the deed. This is not to hold that the 
builder is required to construct a perfect house. Whether the house is defective 
is detennined by the test of reasonableness and not perfection, and the duration 
of such liability after the taking of possession is to be determined by standards 
of reasonableness. 63 
In this statement there are two ideas which courts have consistently agreed 
upon. First. the duration of liability is to be detennined by standards of 
reasonableness64 and second, a builder is not required to construct a perfect house.65 
Yet, the "standard of reasonableness" test doesn't really tell a builder when his liability 
will stop. 
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It has been suggested that the courts can extend the reach of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code to cover the building industry.66 Article 2, providing 
implied warranty protection for items such as cars, appliances and other personal 
property has a four year statute of limitations (which by agreement may be reduced to 
no less than one year).67 When compared with a $1,000 appliance, a four-year 
warranty limitation on an $80,000 new home hardly seems appropriate. Not only do 
the personal property items cost significantly less, they also have a much shorter 
economic life span. In spite of this difference, at least one state has limited the 
wamwty on new housing to a one year period.68 
Although it is unrealistic to expect a builder to insme against defects for the 
total expected life of the house, it is also unrealistic to expect a new house buyer to be 
satisfied with a one year warranty on such a large purchase. Considering variations in 
weather conditions, a latent defect may take several years to become apparent. One 
commentator has suggested that a ten year period of liability should be more than 
sufficient.69 Several courts, recognizing that the various components which go into 
the construction of a house have different life expectancies, refuse to set a specific 
time limit for a warranty on an entire house. 70 
Warranty Disclaimers 
Some sophisticated builders who are aware of the doctrine of implied warranty 
of habitability have included wammty disclaimers in their sales contracts. Of all the 
issues involved in this type of litigation this is the most controversial and inconsistent 
The comts even agree if there ever could be an effective disclaimer, much less 
what would be required to constitute it. 
In Utah, a builder successfully disclaimed all implied warianties.by including 
an "as is" provision in the real estate contract.71 The provision, which specified that 
the purchasers "accepted the property in its present condition," was held to be 
controlling and precluded the purchasers from asserting that the builder had impliedly 
warranted that his homes were constructed in a good workmanlike manner. 
In a contrasting opinion, a Rhode Island court stated that the plaintiff's agreeing 
to taking the .gremises "in the same condition in which they now are" did not constitute 
a disclaimer. 2 Although the wording of this attempted disclaimer was nearly the same 
as in the Utah the comt was reluctant to accept it as an effective disclaimer 
because it didn't use language which specifically referred to its effect on warranties. 
The court said "to effectuate the policies underlying the implied warranties of 
habitability and reasonable workmanship, the court will construe exclusionary 
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provisions of doubtful meaning strictly against those parties raising such provisions as 
defenses. 73 
A Missouri court, in Crowder v. Vandendeale?4 presented a good discussion of 
the requirements of an effective disclaimer.75 First. it recognized the potential vitality 
of traditional contract defense when employed under the proper circumstances. 
According to the court, the parties have a right to make their own bargain as to 
economic risk; but since a disclaimer varies implied warranty tenns, there exists a 
heavy bmden of proof to demonstrate that in fact the bargain was actually made. 
Second, the court stated that one seeking the benefit of a disclaimer must prove 
that there was a conspicuous provision which fully disclosed its consequences. Third, 
the disclaimer must have in fact been voluntarily agreed upon. The builder must bear 
the weight of this burden of proof because by asserting the disclaimer he is trying to 
show that the buyer gave up protection given to him by public policy. Courts will not 
imply that this protection was waived just because boilerplate clauses are included in a 
contract 
Courts have not been able to agree if an express warranty given by a builder 
automatically negates the implied warranties. The court in Richman v. Watel found it 
did not 76 The comt said that because the breach of an implied warranty in housing is 
considered to be a tort rather than a contract concept (a developing concept which will 
be discussed below), the written one year warranty did not limit or exclude the 
implied warranty of :fitness. 
1n Colorado, a court agreed that if the express warranty contained no words of 
limitation, then the builder had not abrogated or limited his common law implied 
warranties.7g However, in Arkansas, it was held that implied warranties are not 
applicable when 1here is an express warranty.79 The court stated that it reached this 
conclusion by analogy to pre-Commelcial Code sales contract cases where it was held 
that if an express warranty was present it was exclusive.80 
ill. The Privity Issue and Subsequent Purchasers 
Prosser described a warranty as a " ... freak hybrid born of the illicit inten:omse 
of tort and contract. "81 The action for breach of warranty was originally a tort action, 
closely resembling the tort of deceit. In the late eighteenth century, courts, for 
procedural convenience, detennined that a contract action could also be maintained 
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As a result, the original tort form of the action, as well as the contract foon, still 
survives today. 
This duality is significant today because, depending upon a particular court's 
choice of contract or tort, several aspects of a case such as the survival of actions, the 
measme of damages, the statute of limitations and the requirement of privity of 
contract will likely vary. Prosser concluded, " ... the concept of warranty has involved 
so many major difficulties and disadvantages that it is very questionable whether it has 
not become rather a burden than a boon to the courts in what they are ttying to 
accomplish. .. 82 
The truth of his conclusion is revealed when one examines the warranty of 
habitability comt decisions. As indicated earlier, in the decisions in which privity was 
the controlling issue, most courts viewed the warranty as sounding in contracts; 
therefore privity is required.83 Moreover, in many instances the comts have also listed 





The first purchaser is the only one with whom the builder may negotiate an 
allocation of the risk. 84 If the builder had lowered the purchase price because 
of defects in the structure he would have double liability if a subsequent 
purchaser were also pemritted to recover. 
A builder is in a better position to know the condition of a home at the time of 
sale rather than at a later date.85 '· 
Real estate transactions require a written contract or deed. Each subsequent 
purchaser may require from his vendor any warranties he wishes. to have on 
improvements.86 
There are significant differences between manufactured products and homes 
that analogies are not appropriate. 87 
(5) There are several other means of protection for the home buyer which will 
enable him to enter the housing market on an equal footing with the builder.88 
Examples are: "astute consumer appraisal of potential builders, inspections 
where possible, support of HOW builders, and government warranties where 
either VA or FHA :financing is utilized. "89 
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In contrast, several courts have now disregarded privity arguments and 
extended warranty protection to subsequent purchasers.90 In 1976 an Indiana court, 
with little commentary, held that a builders implied warranty of fitness for habitation 
runs not only in favor of the first owner, but extends also to subsequent purchasers.91 
However, this implied warranty is limited to latent defects which are not discoverable 
by 1he subsequent pmchasers by reasonable inspection and which become manifest 
only after the purchase. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court, acknowledging that the Indiana court had 
furnished a "reasonably worlcable rule, "92 added its own reason for extending the 
warranty: 
The purpose of a warranty is to protect innocent purchasers and bold 
builders accountable for their work. With that object in mind, any reasoning 
which would arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an obstruction to someone 
equally as deserving of recovery is incomprehensible. Let us asswne for 
example a person contracts construction of a home and, a month after 
occupying, is transferred to another locality and must sell. Or let us look at the 
family which contracts construction, occupies the home and the head of the 
household dies a year later and the residence must, for economic reasons, be 
sold. Further, how about the one who contracts for construction of a home, 
occupies it and, after a couple of years, attracted by a profit incentive caused 
by inflation or otherwise, sells to another. No reason has been presented to us 
whereby the original owner should have the benefits of an implied warranty or 
a recovery on a negligence theory and the next owner should not simply 
because there has been a transfer. Such intervening sales, standing by 
themselves, should not, by any standard of reasonableness, effect an end to an 
implied warranty or, in that matter, a right of recovery on any other ground, 
upon manifestation of a defect. The builder always has available the defense 
that the defects are not attributable to him. 93 
Also relying upon the Indiana decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
abolished the privity requirement for liability.94 The rule it was essentialiy 
identical to those in Indiana and Wyoming. Three justifications for its decision were 
set forth: 
( 1) Because latent construction defects can swface several years after the initial 
sale, there is no sound basis for the reasoning that only first oWners need 
warranty protection. 
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(2) Prospective purchasers rely on the builder's expertise. 
(3) Because of their limited knowledge purchasers cannot discover latent 
construction defects. 95 
Mississippi has also experienced a transformation in overruling well-
established precedents in abolishing the privity requirement. In a lengthy, well-
reasoned decision. the Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled 
The current trend in other jurisdictions extends protection to remote 
purchasers who have no contractual relationship or privity with the builder-
vendor. For example, where a remote purchaser can prove negligence on the 
part of the builder vendor which results in foreseeable injury or loss to the 
remote purchaser, a remote purchaser has been entitled to recovery for 
damages. (citations omitted) And, the privity barrier has also been removed in 
recent cases based on the implied warranty theory. (citations omitted) In light 
of this new substantial trend of authority, we think it worthwhile to reexamine 
our past rulings on this issue.96 
In reexamining its position, the Mississippi Court opined that there is no reasonable 
justification not to extend the same protection to a subsequent purchaser as to the 
initial purchaser; consequently, the. Court abolished the privity requirement97 
Although privity was not the central issue, Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
decisi<m.., 98 dicta indicated ·that privity requirements also have been eliminated. The 
court made it clear that the sale of a house carries with it an implied warranty of 
habitability, and that a breach of such warranty gives rise to a cause of action in tort 
rather than contract Since privity of contract is not relevant in a tort action, warranties 
should extend to subsequent purchasers. Along this same line, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas has fmmd that a house is a "product" for purposes of the Arkansas strict 
liability statute and the District of Colwnbia District Court has not precluded 
condominiums from falling under the same analysis. 99 Therefore the implied warranty 
of habitability was extended to subsequent purchasers for a reasonable length of time. 
The Arkansas court, quoting another case in justifying its decision, succinctly stated, 
In this era of complex marketing practices and assembly line 
manufacturing conditions, restrictive notions of privity of contract 
between manufacturer and conswner must be put aside and the realistic 
view of strict liability adopted 100 
28 
IV. Products Liability Compared 
Several courts which have extended the wammty protection to subsequent 
purchasers indicated that they did so because they could see no significant reason to 
differentiate between strict liability for manufactured products and real estate 
improvements. This section of the paper will first review the . for 
creating strict liability and then discuss whether the same reasorung IS applicable to 
improved real estate. 





The public interest in human life, health and safety demands the maximmn 
possible protection that the law can give against dangerous defects in products 
which consumers must buy, and against which they are helpless to protect 
themselves; and it justifies the imposition, upon all suppliers of such products, 
of full responsibility for the harm they cause, even though the supplier has not 
been negligent 
The supplier, by placing the goods upon the market, repre.sent to the public that 
they are suitable and safe for use; and by packaging, advertising or otherwise, 
he does everything he can to induce that belief. He intends and expects that the 
product will be purchased and used in reliance upon tbis assurance of safety, · 
and it is in fact so purchased and used. The supplier has invited and solicited 
the use; and when it leads to disaster, he should not be pennitted to·avoid the 
responsibility by saying that he has made no contract with the consumer. 
It is already possible to enforce strict liability by resort to a series of actions, in 
which the retailer is first held liable on a warranty to his purchaser, and 
indemnity on a warranty is then sought successively from other suppliers, until 
the manufactmer finally pays the damages, with the added cost of repeated 
litigation. This is an expensive, time consuming and wasteful process, and it 
may be interrupted by insolvency, lack ofjmisdiction, disclaimer, or the statute 
of limitations, anywhere along the line. What is needed is a blanket rule which 
makes any supplier in the chain dll'ectly liable to the ultimate user and so short-
circuits the whole unwieldy procedure.101 
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A comparison of these reasons (for establishing strict liability for defective 
products) and the reasons the courts have stated for creating implied warranties of 
habitability reveals no substantial differences. As with products, there is certainly a 
public interest in protecting consumers from defects in housing. Consumers are 
certainly no less helpless when buying a house than when buying a product. 
California vezy early recognized the application of strict liability concepts 
within the pruview of the implied warranty of habitability. Applying dicta from the 
landmazk California strict liability case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. , 102 
the California court reasoned that if injmy results from defective worlananship, then 
strict liability may apply even though the "product" is a home. 103 
The builder, much like the supplier, places his housing upon the market and 
represents that it is suitable and safe for use. Why should he be permitted to avoid 
responsibility just because he had no contact with a subsequent pW'Chaser? Also, as 
wilh product liability, what is the sense in requiring a subsequent purchaser to sue his 
vendor, and on up the line, if the defect is ultimately the responsibility of the builder? 
As Prosser stated, it is "an expensive, time conswning and wasteful process ... "104 
There are a few weak arguments set forth attempting to show why strict 
liability is appropriate for products, but not housing. One argmnent is that products 
are mass marketed. housing is not 105 Through mass-marketing it is argued that 
suppliers attempt to insulate themselves behind a wall of intermediaries. In contrast, 
builders contract directly wi1h the original purchaser. The argument concludes with 
the statement that a builder-vendor may not have been reasonably expected to 
anticipate a change in ownership. · 
·This argument is simply untenable. Reasonable builders would anticipate 
change in ownership. Anyway, what difference does it make? If the home has a latent 
defect which eventually manifests itself: why should it matter who the builder 
expected to own it? It is 1he latent defect which gives rise to the liability, not the 
status of the owner. Moreover what difference should it make if a builder attempts to 
insulate himself from liability by a wall of intennediaries or first purchasers? Again, 
the liability arises from the builder's defect/negligence. not the status of the owner. 
Other attempted distinctions have no more strength than the argmnent above. 
For example, one court emphasized that material and workmanship which may go into 
a home are of infinite variety. 106 An original purchaser may have negotiated for lesser 
quality. That is true; but isn't 1his also true of products? Some products sell for lower 
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because of inferior materials or workmanship. But, manufacturers are still 
poten1tially liable for latent defects. 
By way of illustration: would a consumer reasonably expect his new mower to 
explode just because it was the less expensive model? Obviously not. Would a 
subsequent purchaser of a home expect his walls to cave in because his home was the 
less expensive model? Again, obviously not. 
v. Conclusion 
Courts have recognized that the purchase of a home is usually the largest single 
purchase of a lifetime. Purchasers are generally helples.s in the transaction because 
they lack the training and experience to recognize the possible latent defects. To 
remedy the situation. in the past twenty years forty-one jurisdictions have court· 
created warranties of habitability. Generally, the warranties state that when a builder· 
vendor sells a home to an initial purchaser there exists an implied wammty of 
habitability. Because it is court created, the rule varies quite extensively from 
jmisdiction to jurisdiction. Consequently, many courts have placed artificial 
limitations upon the warranty. 
One such limitation is the requirement that a plaintiff must be an initial 
purchaser in order to recover. However, this limitation has come under rigorous 
scrutiny; states such as Mississippi, South Carolina, and Wyoming have reviewed this 
limitation and have found it wanting. As the Mississippi Supreme Court noted, it 
seems that the trend has shifted. When scrutinized under a reasonableness test, there 
can be no justification to preclude a subsequent purchaser from a cause of the 
privity requirement serves no pmpose. There appears to be no sound reasoning for the 
limitation other than the fact that many courts see the warranty as one based on 
contract.I07 
Yet. some courts, like the District of Columbia, have moved the area of implied 
warranty of habitability out of contract law and into the tort area; thus, rules governing 
tort actions, including strict liability, 108 become applicable. Consequently, a 
comparison of the development of strict products liability and the development of the 
warranty of habitability reveals that the policy considerations for both are vecy similar. 
If the similarity in development continues, courts may follow the D.C. example and 
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FOR LOVE OR MONEY: NONPROF1T SURVIVAL 
IN A FOR PROfiT WORLD 
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Once upon a time, the process of budgeting for most nonprofit 
organizations was very simple. My favorite illustration is the 
story of how one Ivy League university set its budget in the 
years right after World War ll. The university was run by one 
vice-president and two deans ... The vice· president and senior 
deans would meet with the president early in the summer at hls 
summer home... Somewhere between the first and second 
martini, the president and his two chief administrators would 
settle the budget for the year and decide on the amount of any 
tuition increase needed to keep the university happily in the 
black. 
Times, of course, have change4. 1 
Variously known as charitable, eleemosynary or nonprofit associations, 
small conununity based organizations whose mission it is "to help the less 
fortunate" are deeply imbedded in the American psyche. Such organizations 
sprang up fast and furiously as the Industrial Revolution sped forward in this 
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